Mental state reasoning has been theorized as a core feature of how we navigate our social worlds, and as especially vital to moral reasoning. Judgments of moral wrong-doing and punish-worthiness often hinge upon evaluations of the perpetrator's mental states. In two studies, we examine how differences in cultural conceptions about how one should think about others' minds influence the relative importance of intent vs. outcome in moral judgments. We recruit participation from three societies, differing in emphasis on mental state reasoning: Indigenous iTaukei Fijians from Yasawa Island (Yasawans) who normatively avoid mental state inference in favor of focus on relationships and consequences of actions; Indo-Fijians who normatively emphasize relationships but do not avoid mental state inference; and North Americans who emphasize individual autonomy and interpreting others' behaviors as the direct result of mental states. In study 1, Yasawan participants placed more emphasis on outcome than Indo-Fijians or North Americans by judging accidents more harshly than failed attempts. Study 2 tested whether underlying differences in the salience of mental states drives study 1 effects by inducing Yasawan and North American participants to think about thoughts vs. actions before making moral judgments. When induced to think about thoughts, Yasawan participants shifted to judge failed attempts more harshly than accidents. Results suggest that culturally-transmitted concepts about how to interpret the social world shape patterns of moral judgments, possibly via mental state inference.
Introduction
In 2009, U.S. Army Private Bowe Bergdahl walked off of his post in Afghanistan and into a five-year-long period of captivity, held by the Taliban. His disappearance triggered a manhunt that cost huge amounts of time, resources, and even a few soldiers' lives. Starting in late 2015, a year after Bergdahl's return to American soil, his story became part of a pop-cultural phenomenon. Millions of people downloaded the podcast Serial (Koenig, 2015) to explore one main question: Is Bergdahl ultimately responsible for the outcome of his disappearance -the lost time, resources, and human lives -even if he did not intend such damage?
That such a story became a pop-cultural hit should come as little surprise; as fundamentally social beings, we spend huge amounts of time figuring out how to interpret and respond to others' actions. But in formulating our responses, how do we determine when someone has done wrong? How do we decide whether or not to punish? For many, the answer lies in focusing on perpetrator intent -we judge actions by thinking about the minds that produced them. For example, the core distinction between murder and manslaughter in the Western legal tradition is mens rea -criminal intent. To establish criminal intent beyond a shadow of a doubt, societies that follow these Western legal traditions consume substantial amounts of time and resources to prove that the perpetrator desired the outcome and believed their actions would create this effect. But the sources of evidence we rely on for intent vs. outcome are quite different. To establish that a murderous outcome occurred, all we need is a body. To establish who done it, we look to fingerprints, eye-witnesses, DNA evidence, and video footage. But for intent, we rely on inferences -indirect evidence from verbal statements and past behavior. However much it may sometimes feel like one can know another's mind, we do not in fact have direct access; intentions don't leave fingerprints or footprints. How then can another person's life ride on something so intangible?
We suggest that the answer lies in cultural conceptions, the local ideas and beliefs, about what makes people tick. Judgments of both the
